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1. Introduction
It is not so long ago that policy makers thought that excessive regional disparities would disappear
automatically in the long run. Arbitrage possibilities arising from competition and factor mobility
were expected to induce a more than average growth performance in lagging regions. Having the
economic engine in a higher gear would eventually make these regions reach the standard of living
realised elsewhere. Where convergence was not swift enough, most likely this could be accelerated
by increasing public infrastructure. Governments responded by pouring huge quantities of concrete
in lagging regions.
These views have recently changed. Indeed, fifty years of costly regional policies in the post-war
period have led to not much more that the sta tus quo (see Quah, 1996 and 1997). Over the most
recent decades, for instance, income inequality among European regions has remained rather
constant from an aggregate point of view. This is discussed further in EIB Papers, Volume 5, Number
2 (“Regional convergence in Europe: Theory and empirical evidence”). Some economists are now
taking this as the natural, or at least as the global-capitalist order of things: the rich get richer and
so do the poor, but without ever catching up.
However, to believe that the productivity gaps are immutable is a mistake. There are certainly some
regions within Europe that started out at relatively low levels, but have now jumped ahead.
Conversely, there are others that have been on the way down the income distribution curve. Given
the complex dynamics of catching-up and falling behind that are at play at the regional level the
only possible approach is to look at what has happened in some real-life examples. With this in
mind, we draw on several case studies of regional development (both at the regional and project
level) to define a range of subjects for further discussion. We should emphasise at the outset that
the purpose of the paper is not to discuss the effectiveness of any existing agency or programme,
but rather the principles that could guide regional development policy in general. The terms,
“transfers” and “grants” are used loosely throughout the paper to mean all types of financial
assistance, including tax breaks, loans and guarantees.
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section we discuss the motivation for policy.
Externalities and market failures are needed to justify policy intervention from an economic
efficiency point of view, and we discuss how geography can lead to these problems. The main
message is that market failures do exist, and countering them is a complex matter.
Section 3 discusses who finances policy interventions. Within a particular country there are usually
automatic transfers between regions due to federal taxes and social payments. It will become clear
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that in Europe regional development policy also implies a transfer of re s o u rces between re g i o n s :
policy that is motivated by economic efficiency will bring with it an element of income re - d i s t r i b u t i o n .
Section 4 turns to project level experience to see what type of investments have contributed to
regional development. Not all projects are equally effective in this task and careful project selection
is critical. The effectiveness of policy in changing location decisions must also be considered.
Section 5 looks at experience in several regions in Greece, Italy and Spain. A number of features
distinguish successful regions from their unsuccessful peers, not least the quality of local public
administration. Public programmes to support investment have not been uniformly successful, given,
amongst other factors, their lack of adaptation to local conditions. 
Section 6 then addresses the possible logic for policy intervention at the EU level. This is far from
straightforward, given the re-distributive nature of regional policy. However, the institutional set-up
of the EU gives scope for inter-governmental transfers as part of overall consensus building. The
appropriate conditionality for the use of EU funds is also discussed. When funding is used to
provide incentives to the private sector, the problem of dead-weight losses - that public funds may
not actually change the real economy in any tangible way - becomes particularly important.
Section 7 introduces the issue of the enlargement of the EU to Eastern Europe, and discusses what
this may imply for regional development policy. The paper concludes with a summary of the policy
lessons that emerge from this broad picture.
2. Spatial market failures
Why are inequalities persistent over time? Does influencing the economic tissue in regions help them
to converge? Is reducing inequalities efficient, feasible or even desirable? The companion edition
to this EIB Papers (i.e. Volume 5, Number 2) sets out the theoretical framework for assessing these
questions in more detail. 
In brief, there are three market failures that may give rise to persistent regional imbalances. A first
one is substantial technological externalities. By this we mean that firms learn from one another how
to do things better. As a result, newcomers will tend to locate in those areas where there is alre a d y
innovative activity, as well as the larger market. A much quoted example of this is California's Silicon
Va l l e y, though the phenomenon of “benefits that are external to the firm” had already been observ e d
by Alfred Marshall at the end of the 19th century in his Principles of Economics. Urban labour
markets may work better (it is easier to find someone with the right skills), there is better access to a
number of shared services (such as legal, accounting, advertising, and equipment repair), and there
may be a more efficient resale market for assets. Within nations, this kind of externality may induce
a core - p e r i p h e ry pattern of economic development. Lower transportation costs are likely to re i n f o rc e
a pattern where firms cluster in some locations since this reduces the chances of losing business of
T h e re are three market
f a i l u res that may give rise
to persistent re g i o n a l
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distant markets. Conversely, a desire by firms to relax competition on each local market tends to
weaken clustering and the outcome may be too little rather than too much concentration.
This brings us to the second type of market imperfections - pecuniary externalities. As a result of the
p roductivity diff e rences outlined above, both skilled workers and capital will tend to flow to richer
a reas. Firms and workers do not, however, account for the impact of their re-location on the well being
of those who stay put or of those who live in the region of destination. For instance, migration will put
a downward pre s s u re on the wage level in the region of destination while demand, and hence prices,
will be boosted at the same time. It is thus possible that the economy becomes inefficiently org a n i s e d .
We cannot say in general whether the combination of these externalities leads to excessive
agglomeration or not. All this will depend on local circumstances, and trying to change economic
geography can become very complex. For example, a new highway linking a lagging region may simply
expose that region to increased competition from imports. The long-run effect, as businesses re l o c a t e
away from the region, can be that jobs become scarcer – exactly opposite to what was intended.
There is a third reason why imbalances can prevail. In some cases a region does not take off
because a minimum threshold of economic activity has not been established. No one knows how
a new business would perform in such an area, as many prices are not known in advance. Lack of
adequate information will then prevent the development of a network of service and intermediate
goods suppliers, which leads, of course, to a vicious circle and persistent underdevelopment.
Unfortunately, it is not clear that the information needed to counter this problem is available to
governments, whereas all the other features mentioned above may also come into play. This makes
the design of effective policy a challenging task.
In sum, the microeconomics of location decisions tells us that the possibility of incomplete markets
and the associated co-ordination failure gives a general justification for regional policy from an
efficiency point of view (in fact it is the only market failure that will always lead to unsatisfactory
concentration), and that trying to change economic geography is a complex task due to the many
technological and pecuniary externalities that may be at play.
Obviously, the optimal policy would be one where the economic agents responsible for a market
failure also finance its correction. But where does this leave us if a co-ordination failure is the root
of the regional problem?
3. The logic for regional development at the national level
To d a y, people in Europe tend to stay where they are despite wage diff e rentials between regions (1).
For example, a study by Obstfeld and Peri (1998) reports that labour mobility in Germany, Italy
and the UK was only about one third of the US level. Their data is shown in Table 1. While
1) This is unlike the situa tion in the 1950s and 1960s, when some 12 million southern Europeans moved northwards. 
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international comparisons of migration are difficult due to the lack of comparable data, this overall
picture is confirmed by other studies. Important reasons for immobility includes the functioning of
the housing market and a lack of information of job opportunities elsewhere. Low mobility means
that public spending for regional development must lead to a transfer from one group to another,
since the people who are net recipients (in the lagging region) are not the same as the net
contributors (in the more prosperous region). 
Why should one group wish to support another? Clearly, most societies agree that some sort of
social safety net is needed for people that are unable to support themselves. It is also common that
the wealthier are considered as more able to pay for these expenditures. Particularly within a loca l
community it may also be in the self-interest of the more prosperous suburbs to support their less
fortunate neighbours. For example, poverty may lead to the under provision of some public goods
and services – e.g. street lights, public parks and other public amenities – and may breed increased
criminality and vandalism in the rich areas. By accepting a premium – i.e. paying a more than
proportional share of the total bill – the prosperous are able to protect their property rights without
having to resort to more expensive options.
Table 1. Average net interregional migration (% of regional population).
Period USA Germany Italy UK
1970-9 1.20 0.27 0.37 0.47
1980-9 0.84 0.34 0.33 0.26
1990-5 0.87 0.31 0.40 0.20
Average relative to USA 100% 32% 38% 32%
Notes: Figures are population-weighted averages over regions. German numbers are for western Länder only,
leaving out Berlin
Source: Obstfeld and Peri, 1998
But how does the concept of social cohesion apply to regional development when we take a
broader national view? A first observation is that the inequalities of average income that are found
across space within in a particular country – say differences of two-to-one at the provincial or county
level (2) – are dwarfed by the scale of other income inequalities that are found within regions. 
Richer regions will naturally be ready to help fund projects that are in their own interest wherever
they may be located. These include (3):
2) Such as the French régions or G erman Regierungsbezirke.
3) This list is not meant to be comprehensive . There are other public goods a t the na tiona l level such as defence , and when
large income differentia ls exist the fear of immigra tion may a lso motiva te transfers. It is sometimes asserted tha t uniform
geographica l distribution of economic activity is in itself a  public good , but it is hard to see why this would be so.
Low mobility means that
public spending for
regional development
must lead to transfers
between groups, since the
recipients are not the
same as the contributors.
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• when major transportation connections cross poorer regions; and,
• when pollution spreads across regions, or society attaches a particular value to the natural
environment wherever it may be – in other words, when the environment is a public good.
Self-interest aside, it is probably fair to say that taxpayers in richer regions are unlikely to be highly
motivated by the goal of minimising inequalities that exist across space. However, it is rarely the
case that richer regions can say that everyone must accept their own geographical situation. What
makes this impossible is unemployment and the existence of national fiscal solidarity.
It is common for lagging regions to have high and persistent unemployment, and for these patterns
to have remarkable stability. For example, Daniel Moucque (in EIB Papers, 5(2)) notes that the 25
regions with the lowest unemployment in Europe have hardly changed with an unemployment rate
steady at about 4 percent. This is likely to be close to a minimum given frictional unemployment.
On the other hand, rates in the most affected regions remain at over 20 percent, and even show a
tendency to increase. In fact the evidence does suggest that regional growth usually comes from
increasing the productivity of those already in work rather than broadening the job market.
High levels of unemployment arise, at least partially, from rigidities in labour markets. While
productivity rates are lower in poorer regions than in the richer core, wages may be influenced by
factors at the national level, such as wage bargaining between unions and employers (e.g. see
Faini, 1999) - the result is that workers in poor regions are priced out of the market (4). Regions
with persistent unemployment may be a continual drain on the public purse due to entitlements to
unemployment benefits and social security payments, also set at the national level.
Fiscal payments between regions may be in everyone's interest when they act as an insurance
against asymmetric shocks that hit one region after another. This may be particularly the case if
regional economic stru c t u res are dominated by sectoral specialisation and monopolist industries (5).
In this case, the economic costs of restructuring may be very significant, and some form of insurance
is a rational response. However, this has become a very one-sided affair for many European
regions due to the rigidities we have just described. Because of this richer regions may be willing
to make some additional payments to poorer regions in order to reduce unemployment. These may
convert into quite large sums if unemployment is high and social benefits are generous. 
Of course, this may be something of a chicken-and-egg problem. The reasons for low migration are
complex, but at least one of the reasons is that relatively generous social security payments reduce
the incentives to search for jobs in other regions. Consequently, the best option would be to deal
with the malfunctioning of the labour market directly. Lower nominal wages in poorer regions would
4) In the US reg iona l shocks usua lly lead to some unemployment, so markets are not fully flexible in tha t country either.
However, unemployment subsequently returns to a steady equilibrium ra te as the unemployed migra te to other reg ions (see
Brauerhjelm et a l., 2000 , for further discussion). 
5) C learly, this w ill depend on the size of the reg ions in question.
Even if they are not
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minimising re g i o n a l
inequalities, it is rarely the
case that richer re g i o n s
can say that every o n e
must accept their own
geographic situation.
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not necessarily be unequitable since housing and commuting costs are often significantly lower than
in rich urbanised areas. Nevertheless, labour market reform may not be on the political agenda.
The political process may rather promote regional development transfers since voters are distributed
through space, and voting decisions in the poorer regions may be influenced by public spending.
Avoiding the emergence of moral hazard at the regional level may mean that aid should include
certain conditionality. We return to this issue later. At the same time, it should be recognised that
claimants may argue that they deserve a share of the benefits that arise due to stronger
agglomeration within a small number of regions. All this shows how complex the issue of
interregional equity is.
The second best option of using public spending to change economic geography would still be
desirable if it is at least effective in achieving its goal. However, we have already mentioned that
the complex economic forces leading to agglomeration mean that the long-run outcome of some
policies may be counter-productive (6). And, aside from issues of microeconomic structures, there
are important institutional issues to be addressed. Let us start with a look at which types of projects
have been successful in achieving regional development in the past.
4. Lessons from ex-post studies
The paper by Bertrand Rossert (this volume) looks at the ex-post experience of a number of projects.
Rossert notes that two special features distinguish regional development projects from investments
in other regions. Firstly, public money is involved and this means that there are many groups who
consider that they have a say in a project's outcome (e.g. local government, unions, landowners,
local industries, etc.). Unfortunately, these stakeholders are not well-defined at the start of
negotiations. As some can effectively block the project going ahead there can be repeated rounds
of inconclusive bargaining. There seems room for improvement here, and agencies supporting
regional development should strive to identify all interest groups and to see that they are involved
as partners at an early stage in the project cycle. 
Secondly, local public administrations have a share of responsibility for project delays due to lack
of management skills and organisational failures. Rossert notes that this includes a confusion
between budgeting procedures and effective multi-year planning and incentive structures that
encourage individuals to avoid taking responsibility. These organisational failures extend to public
administration outside lagging areas. For example, there may be little co-ordination between public
fund providers who, to complicate matters, also pursue different agendas. Rossert argues that “it is
not, as is sometimes heard , tha t too much money is going to the reg ions, but tha t money is spread
too thinly on too many projects.” This agrees with the fact that increasing returns are present in
6) They a lso mean tha t the fina l distributiona l outcome of a  particular policy is hard to determine . There could a lso be
distributiona l impacts w ithin the popula tion of a  g iven reg ion. Philippe M artin (in EIB Papers 5(2)) illustra tes this by assessing
the impact of removing policies tha t hinder the reloca tion of business from the periphery to the core (e .g . lega l barriers to
plant closure). 
Public money is involved
and there are many
g roups that consider they
have a say in a pro j e c t ' s
outcome. 
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almost all activities, and suggests that efficient regional policies should have a small and well-
defined set of targets (7).
The ex-post examination of project outcomes shows important differences due to the size of the new
investment (relative to the local economy) and the presence that an investor already has in the
region through prior investments. The projects that seem to have been most effective in developing
regional economies are:
• Large investments that bring a completely new business to a region. Such investors are able to
modify the environment in their favour and are typically in a position to make take-it-or-leave-it
proposals to local groups. 
• Small projects that are fully integrated into the local economy. These are often joint-ventures to up-
grade existing companies. They must establish effective local networks to survive, and may have
a backbone of relationships to build upon.
Conversely, the project managers of large investments that complement existing facilities in a well-
established sector (such as infrastructure) will often be in a weak negotiating position with other
groups and project design and implementation gets distorted as a result. Indeed, these companies
may already be part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Small projects in new sectors
will often try to minimise the group of stakeholders they must deal with by setting up “off-shore”
operations. These may be of very marginal benefit to the local economy.
There is a third critical dimension to this typology of projects: can policy be effective in changing
the location decisions of investors? If regional development is due to a co-ordination failure - a
working hypothesis in this paper - then subsidising only one private agent to the point where she
decides to proceed may be an extremely expensive and inefficient way to go about things. This
subsidy must compensate for all the risks that markets (labour force, suppliers, etc.) do not develop
as hoped, and that local institutions may hinder project implementation. These risks may not be
great when relatively small firms are the main investors and local companies are involved from
inception (e.g. via a joint-venture), but they may be very significant when companies from outside
the region are considering a major investment in a completely new sector. A corollary is that private
sector investment decisions may only be changed if the public aid provided is significant with
respect to the project costs.
Policy can be based upon granting investment subsidies to certain types of projects, but the entire
business environment can also be affected by a range of other factors ranging from the standard
of infrastructure to the skill level of the local population. In the next section we take a broader
approach to try to see what combination of factors build success.
7) The European Commission holds a  similar view w ith respect to geographica l elig ibility. For example , European
Commission (1998 , section 1) sta tes: “Past experience shows that, to be effective in regional development terms such
assistance should not be spread too thinly over areas which are too large or fragmented. We need to increase the
concentration of Community part-financing if we are to reach a critical mass and have a significant impact…”
Subsidising only one agent
to the point where she
decides to proceed may be
a very inefficient way of
going about things.
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5. Twin stories
5.1 The case study approach
Would you expect two twins to run equally fast? Are there subtle differences that are not visible at
first glance? What is the role of nutrition and exercise? In any country, there are regions that
seemed to have been very similar to start with, but nonetheless have developed at very different
rates. Clearly, it is a complex matter to try to identify the reasons why. Modern economic geography
suggests that the explanation could well be the nature of the agglomeration processes which lie at
the origin of regional imbalances. In order to gain more insight about what this means, we should
look at what actually happened in a number of case studies to see if any common features can be
identified. Three papers in this volume provide such studies for regions in Greece (by Yannis
Ioannides and George Petrakos), Italy (by Rodolfo Helg, Giovanni Peri and Gianfranco Viesti), and
Spain (by Andrés Rodríguez-Pose). Each study includes a region that has performed well (in
national terms), and another which is lagging behind. The regions were chosen to cover a range
of policy experiments, regional autonomy and geography. In the Greek case, both of the regions
selected for study were relatively peripheral and had particular sectoral structures, so a third region
was included as a benchmark. Note that all the studies deal with the catch-up by regions that were
relatively less developed, rather than the problems of restructuring declining industrial regions.
What then do our twin stories reveal?
5.2 Building strength 
The “winners” in this particular competition are Crete in Greece, Abruzzo in Italy, and Navarre in
Spain. At the risk of over-simplification we will try to indicate one or two points that the authors'
emphasise in each case study.
Crete – Greece's most southern island – is one of the most successful regions in the country outside
the metropolitan areas of Athens and Thessaloniki. A critical factor in the region's take-off was the
development of the tourist industry, and this would not have happened without the construction of
international airports. The tourism sector was linked into the local economy through networks of
suppliers, permitting a relatively broad-based development of the regional economy.
The catalyst for the success of Abruzzo (which is on the Adriatic coast, at about the same latitude
as Rome) was largely due to two main policy interventions. Firstly, regional investment incentives
were similar throughout the Mezzogiorno. Abruzzo on the northern border of the assisted area
benefited from what was essentially preferential treatment given the higher transport costs for
locations further down the Italian peninsula. The north-south and east-west motorways allowed for
a substantial reduction of transportation costs to main markets (though this did not improve the
relative attractiveness of more southern regions). As a result, a number of small locally-owned
plants, often sub-contractors for firms in the North, grew up in Abruzzo.
Taking a broader appro a c h ,
what combination of factors
builds success? What was
d i ff e rent in those re g i o n s
that failed to converg e ?
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Secondly, investments from state-owned firms in Abruzzo were mainly in relatively human capital
intensive industries, such as telecommunications and mechanical engineering. Interestingly this was
because the lack of large ports in the region impeded the building of large petrochemical and steel
plants – the strategy for much of the rest of the Mezzogiorno. As a result, Abruzzo was able to
develop an economic structure based upon large “knowledge-based” factories and networks of
small companies. Productivity growth was translated into job creation.
The Spanish region of Navarre lies on the French border. The two prime drivers here were the
support of existing firms, particularly smaller enterprises (via favourable tax treatment and subsidies)
and the attraction of foreign direct investment. Thanks to its financial and fiscal autonomy, Navarre
has been able to grant special tax-breaks to encourage new investments, and this may have
allowed better tailoring of the development strategy towards the region's needs.
5.3 Examining the weak
What was different in those regions that failed to converge – Peloponnese in Greece, Sicily in Italy,
and Galicia in Spain?
The nort h e rn part of the Peloponnese is close to Athens, but much of the peninsula is mountainous with
a thinly spread population and poor transportation connections. It is thus not surprising that firms are
concentrated at the nort h e rn bord e r. In spite of regionally diff e rentiated national investment incentives
– which made Peloponnese a favoured region – these measures failed to attract more or larger pro j e c t s
to the region. Policies that had aimed at exploiting local natural re s o u rces might have helped the south
of the Peloponnese better. For instance, the failure of this region to fully take advantage of its coast
line and historical heritage as a tourist re s o u rce, is at least in part due to poor or badly implemented
policies. In fact, Ioannides and Petrakos conclude firmly that the poor quality of the public
administration is the main reason behind the ineffectiveness of regional policies in Greece. 
Thessaly, the third Greek region studied, is on the eastern coast of the mainland. Its industrial base
was in sectors that have come under severe pressure from international competition. Industrial
subsidies appear to have helped in this restructuring; however, the region has not developed the
local processing of its agricultural products, and the growth of market services has been limited by
the dominance of the Athens metropolis. Its relatively good administration, as reflected in its
performance in implementing EU supported programmes, has allowed it to maintain an
intermediate performance between the other two regions. In general, this third Greek study is in-
line with the conclusions from the more clear cut success and failure.
In Sicily, on the other hand, too much emphasis was put on public expenditure. Helg et a l.,
document how this was used to fuel employment, but how, as a result, wages began to be
unresponsive to productivity differentials. This became a major obstacle for the development of both
private manufacturing and competitive services. In addition, as in most of the Mezzogiorno, the
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investment by state-owned industries was concentrated on large-scale and heavy industries. Such
capital-intensive industries failed to generate backward and forward linkages with local companies.
Of course, this region had an additional handicap that discouraged an inflow of private investment,
namely a relatively higher crime level and the presence of the Mafia.
Galicia is in the extreme north-western corner of Spain. Here too public spending was used to
generate employment in public administrations, and there was over-investment in public
infrastructure. This was a relatively easy strategy for regional politicians, but has yet to have much
impact. The economic fabric in Galicia consists of many small companies employing a lower skilled
workforce. These firms have little capacity to network with other firms in and outside the region, and
there have been only meagre results from the Galician SME support program. Rodríguez-Pose
concludes that an unfocused public administration has been unable to develop effective policies,
despite the region's substantial fiscal autonomy.
5.4 Developing a region's comparative advantage
As noted earlier in this essay, the impact of regional policy depends very much on the underlying
externalities at play, and the case studies illustrate that a uniform approach towards development
would have been mostly ineffective.
In two cases strategic infrastructure investment changed economic geography in a favourable way
– this occurred with the airports in Crete and the motorways in Abruzzo. However, in many cases
road building and the construction of other public works appears to have been used as a way to
put people to work rather than anything else. To give an overly simplified example, a dense network
of motorways would not have helped Crete to exploit its tourism potential any better. It is perhaps
for this reason that Vanhoudt et al., (in EIB Papers 5(2)) find no links between public investment and
growth from their panel data study. When taken to the extreme, as in Sicily, public spending drives
up wages to the point where the development of the private sector is stunted.
Incentives by the regional and national governments to encourage domestic investment and to attract
f o reign direct investment were also helpful, as the cases of Abruzzo and Navarre clearly show. The
sector and industrial organisation of large industrial investments was also key. In successful re g i o n s ,
these investments provided an export base while also increasing the demand for supplies from local
sub-contractors. In the case of Crete the tourism sector played this role, illustrating that there are
options even for remote locations. However, general investment subsidies set at the national level
seemed to have benefited some regions more than others, due to varying local conditions.
As with public spending, investment subsidies may be counterproductive when poorly designed.
Especially when firms know that they are entitled to repeated regional support, resources may be
shifted to rent-seeking activities such as (political) lobbying, rather than to investing in productivity
improvements or in exploring new markets. The incentive for these rent-seeking activities increases
A uniform approach to
development would have
been ineff e c t i v e .
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in general with the size of the sunk-cost of the industry. This may partially explain why subsidies did
not work very well in those regions with a bias towards capital-intensive heavy industries.
The importance of skills in the workforce also emerges in the Spanish and Italian success stories.
This was particularly important in the development of SMEs as subcontractors to larger factories.
However, human capital does not appear as a key issue in Crete, perhaps due to the nature of the
tourist sector.
The dominant theme in all three countries is the importance of local and regional public authorities.
The success of policies implemented in the well-performing regions was to a large extent attributable
to a much better oiled administrative machine. This is perhaps not surprising given the local
knowledge needed to understand a region's strengths and weaknesses, and to help co-ordinate the
development of new activities in a region.
6. Regional development at the EU level
6.1 The logic for EU policy
We have drawn a fairly coherent picture of what regional policy should be trying to do and why
policy exists in the first place. But how do EU level transfers fit into the picture we have sketched
out? Article 130a of the Amsterdam Treaty states that the “Community sha ll a im a t reducing
disparities between the levels of development of the various reg ions and the backwardness of the
least favoured reg ions or islands, including rura l areas”, so a clear social cohesion objective exists.
The Treaty also explicitly foresees that this will be achieved by financial transfers from the EU budget
and through lending by the EIB.
The EU Structural Funds, at just under 1/2 percent of the Union's GDP, are the main source of grant
aid for this purpose. The main focus for support is the so-called Objective 1 regions – areas which
have incomes per capita of less than 75 percent of the EU average. The EIB lending for projects
located in assisted areas was one-half of the Structural Funds last year. EIB loans are not explicitly
subsidised, but a number of benefits (tax exemption, highest possible credit rating due to the
support of member states, relatively lower return on equity vis-à-vis the private sector, etc.) are
passed on to customers. The EIB can also compensate for the lack of development of financial
markets in recipient regions, though the scope for this will be reduced in the post-EMU environment.
Also at the EU level we must consider the issues developed in Section 3. Why is EU intervention needed
to deal with regional income gaps when there are much larger income diff e rentials in the population of
a particular country? This is even more an issue at the EU level, since social insurance is dealt with by
national government - and there are not automatic fiscal transfers between countries due to
unemployment diff e rentials. At first sight, it is not clear why a group located, say, in a nort h e rn Euro p e a n
capital city should wish to support another, completely unrelated community on a Mediterranean island.
Indeed, one can think of much closer regions where there is no love lost between communities.
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It is also the case that the NUTS-2 regions used to assess eligibility for aid, based as they are upon
administrative regions in each country, are far from being well-defined and comparable
geographical units (8). What does it mean to say that the residents of Luxembourg (population, 0.4
million) are 3 times richer than those of Andalucia (population, 7.2 million), 2 1/2 times richer than
Sicilians (population, 5.1 million), and more than 2 times richer than the residents of Attiki
(population, 3.4 million)? The data for income inequality is further distorted by the fact that some
regions are based upon the centres of major cities, and there is substantial cross-border commuting.
While output is measured at workplaces, population is based upon residence. For example,
Brussels has a population of close to one million, but the broader metropolitan area which can be
considered as a self-contained labour market comprises over 3 million people (9).
Thisse (in EIB Papers 5(2)) develops another example: Ile-de-France (a NUTS-2 region) is formed by
several d é p a r t e m e n t s of very varied income levels (such as Seine-Saint-Denis, a poor region, and
Hauts-de-Seine, a much wealthier one), but each of which is individually comparable to NUTS-2
regions in some other countries (e.g. Belgium). Table 2 shows the ratio of incomes between the richest
and poorest NUTS-3 region (equivalent to French d é p a r t e m e n t s) found within a given NUTS-2 level
(in purchasing power adjusted per capita terms) (10). The dispersion alluded to before between
NUTS-2 regions within a country is also shown. The problem of borders becomes more important at
lower administrative levels, but the data does hint at a substantial variation of incomes within re g i o n s .
These definitional problems are critical if policy is motivated by equity considerations.
Clearly, the issue of why EU intervention should be needed to deal with spatial inequalities could
be avoided if transfers improve the welfare for everyone – much as we have suggested in the
discussion of the local level above. Indeed, this is explicit in much of the language used to justify
EU spending. For example, the European Commission (1996, p. 13) in its “First Report on
Economic and Social Cohesion” states (11):
“Imba lances do not just imply a poorer qua lity of life for the most disadvantaged reg ions…but
indica te an under-utilisa tion of human potentia l and a fa ilure to take advantage of economic
opportunities which would benefit the Union as a  whole.” [emphasis added]
Although there may be common benefits from completing communication networks or for improving
the environment – these are straightforward cases – how could regional development per se be
beneficial? In general we should start by discounting a Keynesian view that increased aggregate
8) N UTS stands for the Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques, the classifica tion used in Eurosta t's REG I O
da tabase . There are few exceptions to this classifica tion for defining O bjective 1 sta tus for reg ions tha t qua lified under a
previous reg ime . In the follow ing example , we use 1996 da ta and incomes are measured in purchasing power parity terms.
9) Cheshire and Hay (1989) develop these issues further. The definition of an economic “reg ion” is a lso discussed in Vanhove
(1999).
10) O f course , this requires tha t the N UTS-2 level consists of a t least two N UTS-3 reg ions. This is not a lways the case (e .g .
among others: Stockholm, Brabant W a llon, Hamburg , N avarra , A lgarve).
11) The M a astricht Trea ty (Article 130b) initia ted a regular reporting by the Commission on the progress made towards
achieving economic and socia l cohesion. This is the first such report.
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demand in the EU will benefit all members, not least because regional aid is not granted in a
counter cyclical manner. Moreover, richer areas are often at full capacity, while resources in
lagging regions remain under-utilised. 
Table 2. Dispersion within NUTS-2 regions, 1996
Country Maximum …found in the Minimum …found in the Ratio of maximum
NUTS-3 NUTS-2 NUTS-3 NUTS-2 to minimum NUTS-2
spread region of spread region of region in the country
Germany 5.23 Rheinhessen-Pfa lz 1.25 G ießen 3.11
UK 3.62 Inner London 1.08 Cumbria 3.16
France 3.53 Ile de France 1.04 A lsace 1.35
Portugal 2.89 N orte 1.91 A lentejo 1.46
Greece 2.76 Dytiki Ellada 1.11 Sterea Ellada 1.72
Netherlands 2.57 Groningen 1.11 G elderland 1.79
Austria 2.24 O berösterreich 1.16 Vorarlberg 2.33
Belgium 2.14 Antwerpen 1.20 Vla ams Brabant 1.70
Spain 1.58 C astilla -la M ancha 1.07 C anarias 1.82
Finland 1.44 Uusima a (suura lue) 1.04 Pohjois-Suomi 1.75
Sweden 1.17 Ö stra Mellansverige 1.01 Sydsverige 1.33
Note: The spread is computed as the ratio of maximum to minimum PPP adjusted per capita income.
Source: Eurostat, REGIO database. 
The mutual desirability of European transfers should rather be seen in the context of side-payments
between governments to reach agreement on other matters. This could be the case if there are
economies of scale in some joint activity or if individual countries possess a veto on decisions (e.g.
Treaties require unanimous decisions to be changed). Such payments can then still be in the net
donor's interest even if there is not a great belief in pan-European income equality. Let us take an
example. The creation of an integrated market may entail initial costs for some participating
countries if their economies are less able to face the resulting competition. This would justify these
governments running persistent deficits for a period of time. Unfortunately, such a policy response
could be constrained by the parallel launch of a monetary union that requires balanced budgets if
not surpluses to lower government indebtedness. The only practical solution to this dilemma may be
for there to be transfers to the affected group (12).
12) Assessing the impact of the Single M arket is a  complex ma tter since adverse sta tic shocks could be more than
compensa ted by dynamic ga ins, due for example , to increased foreign direct investment (see European Commission, 1997 ,
for some quantita tive estima tes). The European Commission (1990 , chapter 9) g ives a  further discussion of the impacts of
monetary union on the weaker EU economies. 
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To become more concrete, the Cohesion Funds, a supplement to the Structural Funds, were
established by the Maastricht Treaty (Article 130d) for countries with:
• per capita GDP less than 90 percent of the community average (i.e. Greece, Ireland, Spain and
Portugal); 
• an agreed programme to “avoid excessive government deficits” (i.e. in accordance with Article
104c of the Treaty); and,
• to be used for environment and Trans-European transport networks.
The link between the creation of this new fund and the launch of EMU is clear, though the restriction
regarding the types of eligible projects suggest that the donors were trying to ensure some further
common interest.
If transfers play a broader political role, then why should a regional development label be attached
to them? At the national level we have referred to the logic that regional development could be
motivated by the on-going need to reduce social payments to lagging regions. By analogy, it could
also be that having countries of dissimilar levels of development (or having some countries facing
a steady fiscal drain due the presence of large lagging regions within their territory) decreases the
likelihood of reaching a consensus on EU policies, which, in turn, raises the probability of having
to make further side-payments in the future. Consequently, it would be in the interest of richer
regions to use payments to boost growth in the poorer region, for this seems by and far the best
pill to take against the hazards of institutional sclerosis.
Of course, the reasons for establishing EU regional development assistance are irrelevant for the
agencies that are mandated to undertake this task. For them the issue is how to achieve this goal
in the most effective way. What could this mean for tying conditions to the use of funds? If we look
at this in general terms – rather than the technical details of any particular programme – some
possible principles emerge.
6.2 Conditionality on the use of EU aid
While managers of EU aid may consider imposing conditionality on the use of funds to achieve
economic development – approval of investment programmes and the like – this merits two
comments. Firstly, they would not be necessary if there was full confidence in the recipient
government's ability to use its funds. It presupposes that the manager of aid allocations knows better
than the recipient how money should be spent. In this context, subsidiarity would suggest that
relatively stream-lined conditionality should be used when dealing with EU governments. Secondly,
money is fungible and, in so far as certain investments would have taken place anyway, transfers
nominally intended for one purpose may simply free resources for other activities. The restriction
that certain criteria should be met may not pose much of a binding constraint.
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What happens when payments are made directly to local administrations, public companies, or to
the private sector, rather than the coffers of the central government?
Consider local administrations first. A lesson that has emerged for the case studies of Section 5 is
that local governments should be involved if policy is to be sufficiently fine-tuned. Unfortunately, the
technical competence of local officials may not be of the highest quality. Indeed, a common theme
in the case studies (including the ex-post project evaluations) is the correlation between poor
regional growth and poor administration. Local politicians are more likely to be influenced by
interest groups, and often the transparency of local decisions is less than at the national level. All
this argues for the outside approval of investment plans.
An alternative approach is to address the problem (at least partially) at its roots through the training
of public officials. This could come by requiring that a minimum percentage of the total aid package
is used for this purpose, or by offering free technical assistance. Of course, advice can always be
ignored, and the analysis of external consultants would have to be made available to the public if
there is to be transparency over the reasons why particular choices were made.
Saint Luke's advice: “Physician hea l thyself” should be immediately recalled at this point. As Rossert
reminds us, it is often impossible to work out, ex-post, the level of public support that a project has
received from national and European bodies. While such historical analysis does not necessarily
reflect the situation today, it would be surprising if there were not scope for further improvement.
Dealing with state-owned companies (such as railways and toll road networks, etc.) may be very
similar to local authorities, since staff skills in project design and implementation can be lacking.
On the other hand, these companies may have a narrowly defined mission which is in-line with
policy goals. This would mean that individual investments do not require detailed assessment once
there is general confidence in management skills, particularly when there is a long-term relationship
and funding is being provided on an regular on-going basis. 
The situation is much more complicated when aid is given to the private sector. While EU
competition law prohibits in principle all state aids that threaten to distort competition, it may be
permitted for “a id to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is
abnormally low or where there is serious unemployment” (Article 92(3)(a) of the Maastricht Treaty) (13).
As mentioned before, some large projects are successful because investors have sufficient
negotiating power to overcome local lobbying and to drive a project forward. It is exactly this
strength which generates the risk of regulatory arbitrage and a race to the bottom between public
authorities trying to attract investment to their territory, and which justifies the surveillance of EU
competition authorities (14).
13) From 1994 to 1999 , 50 .6 percent of the popula tion of the EU-15 lived in areas elig ible for such a id (European
Commission, 1998), while from 1994 to 1998 some 57 percent of manufacturing a id was spent for reg iona l objectives
(European Commission, 2000).
14) There is not a  uniform view on the degree of this problem. See , for example , Besley and Seabright (1999).
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Furthermore, there is the problem that project promoters act in their own self-interest, and what is
profitable is not necessarily helpful for regional development. This calls for a careful assessment of
whether a project will actually lead to productivity growth in a lagging region or not. Here also
there would appear to be a role for a specialised assessment by neutral outsiders. 
The problem of dead-weight losses is also particularly acute with the private sector – in other words
does policy actually effect location decisions? If a local authority wins a grant for something that
was already decided (though the decision is not necessarily known publicly), the additional grant
will be used by the local authority for other purposes. It is reasonable to suppose that this money
will still be used to benefit the target community in some way. Though there are trade-offs due to
technical capabilities, the difficulty of knowing whether any investment is truly additional can be a
powerful reason for dealing directly with local communities rather than simply passing funds to the
central government. The options for using funds for other purposes (including tax cuts) are simply
more limited. Much the same logic applies to some public companies (15).
Now take the case of a large private sector company which would invest in a particular region
even without public support. If the company then receives aid this becomes a windfall gain that can
be used for any number of purposes. This could include financing investments in completely different
areas or simply increased dividends. Here, the net contribution to regional development of the
funding may be very small. 
Given the critical role of the private sector in regional development that emerges from the case
studies, this issue must be addressed. What can be done to ensure that the real economy is
changed in some positive way by public aid? It is clear that this cannot happen with the ex-post
financing of activities that have already been undertaken. It is even unlikely to happen with
investments that are already underway, unless the project happens to be running into financial
difficulties. In the extreme, it would require that the decision of a private investor to go ahead is
taken simultaneously with the decision to provide aid, and that the availability of finance could be
documented as a factor in the location decision.
7. The enlargement of the Union
The enlargement of the Union eastwards will much increase the dispersion of EU regional incomes.
The average income per capita for the entire ten candidate countries from Eastern Europe is only
15 percent of the EU average at market exchange rates, increasing to about 30 percent when
adjusted for purchasing power parity. The situation improves when the more developed northern
countries are considered separately (incomes are about 20 percent of the EU average at market
exchanges rates, and 40 percent at PPP), but the gap remains very large. There are also substantial
regional inequalities within most Eastern European countries, with relatively higher prosperity in
15) Though to be exact one should say tha t the a id is being used to support agencies or companies w ith a mission for
reg iona l development, ra ther than for reg iona l development projects.
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urban centres and some EU border regions where the service sector has developed strongly. In
some other regions there have been severe job losses due to the restructuring of traditional
industries.
From the point of view of the EU, the entire region would be eligible for support under the usual
Objective 1 definition. Not only that, but even under optimistic growth scenarios it will take decades
for most of the region to converge to the EU average. With a clear path set out for membership
these income differentials are an issue to be dealt with today as much as when formal membership
actually takes place. 
In a departure from previous practice, the EU has introduced the rule that no country may receive
EU Structural Funds above 4 percent of its GDP. The total budget for the Structural Funds for the
2000-2006 period will not be increased despite the additional regional problem of enlargement –
it will remain at the present size of 0.46 percent of EU GDP. While there are reasons for limiting
the flow of funds into an economy – and more on this below – the recent EU budget negotiations
do illustrate that regional development spending must be seen within a broader context. In this
particular case, it is likely that the general view was that candidate countries stand to benefit
substantially from EU enlargement anyway (16). 
What should be done to accelerate the catch-up of the region to the EU? The paper by Margarethe
Quehenberger (this volume) looks at experience in Eastern Germany. The reunification of Germany
is certainly a special case, but as an almost textbook example of a “big bang” programme, it
amplifies some of the key features of government intervention.
In brief, rapid wage growth in Eastern Germany has led to a major down-sizing of the
manufacturing sector. A motivation for the high wage strategy, at least after the event, was the fear
that there would be excessive emigration from the region. In fact, Sinn (2000) argues that the
reason for the rapid growth in wages was due to employer-union negotiations that took place in
1991. At that time there were neither Eastern Germany private entrepreneurs nor strong Eastern
unions. According to Sinn, wage negotiations were dominated by Western Germans (both
employers associations and unions) whose over-riding concern was to avoid job losses is Western
Germany. Rapid wage growth was agreed, as an extreme example of national factors influencing
local wage setting in an undesirable way.
Capital subsidies have helped those industries which have remained in business to modernise their
plant and equipment, and the construction industry has boomed. However, there remains large-
scale unemployment, and this is likely to be exacerbated as investment subsidies are reduced and
the construction sector shrinks to a more normal level. The social security system imported from the
16) In fact most of the ga ins from trade libera lisa tion w ith the EU have a lready been achieved via current Europe Agreements.
In tota l, it has been estima ted tha t further benefits from lower and harmonised tariffs may only be of the order of 11/ 2 percent
of G DPin the candida te countries (see Ba ldw in et a l., 1997). However, much larger benefits - possible an order of magnitude
larger - would arise if increased credibility in macroeconomic stability caused interest ra tes to drop substantia lly.
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West means there is a considerable risk that this will evolve into a long-term unemployment problem,
especially since future growth will hinge on the development of more sophisticated market services
and appropriate skills will become increasingly important. Germany does appear to have created
the conditions where regional development will remain on the political landscape for years to come.
A first observation for Eastern Europe is that maintaining some wage flexibility will be critical. Given
that there is a continuing need for the re-allocation of the workforce between sectors, the risk of
workers getting stuck in persistent unemployment is very real. Too large capital subsides also clearly
distort investment decision towards excessively capital-intensive activities - but this may do little for
the unemployed.
Given the general context, assistance should focus on improving the allocative efficiency of the
Eastern economies. There should be a particular role for the EIB due to the relatively
underdeveloped markets for long-term debt in Eastern Europe. This market failure is not due to
geography per se, but rather because the transition of the region to a fully efficient market economy
has yet to be completed. 
8. Conclusions
Looking forward, a number of studies foresee growing regional specialisation in Europe along the
lines already seen in the US (e.g. Commisaria t généra l du Plan, 1999, and Bruanerhjelm et a l .,
2000); this because the economic forces at play within the two zones will become more and more
similar. Such a trend may not reinforce regional inequality if everyone finds something to specialise
in. However, given that the scope for innovation varies according to sector, it is possible that there
could be the polarisation of Europe into more advanced regions and poorer lagging regions in the
long-run. There may also be increased mobility for the highly-skilled, but a continued lack of mobility
for the lower-skilled workforce. Together with inflexible labour markets this situation could reinforce
a very unequal distribution of unemployment. It is far from clear that the Single Market and EMU
will actually help equalise Europe's regional income distribution.
Concentration of activity is at least partially due to spatial market failures. The most clear cut case
is when there are incomplete markets and a co-ordination failure in creating new economic
activities. Within a country there then is a logic for prosperous regions to help cure regional pockets
of unemployment, at least until regional fiscal autonomy removes the burden of making social
payments to their disadvantaged countrymen. Coming up with a motivation for EU intervention is
less straightforward. The benefits of supranational support, i.e. inter-governmental transfers, should
rather be seen a part of an overall consensus building exercise within a group of sovereign nations. 
A general conclusion is that we should accept that some regional inequality is the normal state of
affairs, much as society tolerates this within any given community. Indeed, the existence of an urban
hierarchy is an almost universal phenomenon. If, as it seems, the existence of a major urban centre
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or of a network of connected medium-sized cities is a major factor for growth, then not all regions
can perform equally if only because historical accident has led to unequal urbanisation. This also
means growth may bring with it local agglomeration – and interregional convergence may come
at the cost of greater intraregional polarisation. 
The regional development studies, both at a project and regional level, highlight the following
features:
• Key strategic infrastructure is essential. There appear to be cases when better communications,
for example, can help shift economic geography to a new equilibrium. However, this certainly
does not apply in a general way to public investment. A more critical attitude about launching
new transport infrastructure would be welcome.
• Industry structure is probably as important. Large factories coming to the region must have an
industrial organisation and use technologies that encourage the use of local sub-contractors and
forward linkages to other local companies. The chances for this are increased if the local
population, particularly those employed by SMEs, have a matching set of skills.
• Tourism can also play a similar role to large factories as the export base for a region. Indeed,
having an unspoilt countryside, traditional town centres, and historical monuments is an asset
rather than a liability.
• Not all projects can be equally effective in generating regional economic activity. It depends,
amongst other factors, upon the range of stakeholders involved, and how negotiations with these
stakeholders are managed. This seems to be affected by the size of a project vis-à-vis the local
economy, and the sunk costs already incurred by a project promoter in the region.
• The quality of regional government is critical if development programmes are to be sufficiently
fine-tuned to local conditions. Since the information needed to design good policy is very high,
we can expect many mistakes. However, the mistakes seem to occur with disproportionate
frequency for some authorities.
How do we convert these factors into a set of criteria for project selection? Clearly, many aspects
will call for qualitative judgements, but that does not mean that a relatively objective view cannot
be taken. The list of issues to be considered includes:
• The forecasting associated with regional development projects is complex due to the significant
change to the local economic environment that is implied. Still, good forecasting should be able
to capture the co-ordination problems we have referred to and projects should be economically
attractive when these forecasts are used as the baseline. It would be unwise to try to manipulate
cost-benefit analysis in an ad hoc way in an attempt to capture other externalities (such as
technical spillovers). Rather these should be addressed through the broad development strategy
chosen.
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• This leads to a critical issue: does the project fit into a coherent strategy to develop a region's
comparative advantage? For example, large-scale public investment should be clearly justified
within such a framework.
• Does this broad strategy include the development of human capital? In particular, does the local
administration have a track record of poor performance? If so, what steps are planned to address
this problem? There may be little point in pouring money over an area in which local government
is unable to become more efficient.
• Is project implementation well thought out given its particular characteristics? As delays are
endemic in some lagging regions, project appraisal should assess that the complete range of
stakeholders, and the associated threats to the project, have been identified. This may require
relatively early participation in the project cycle. Public support for some types of project could
be contingent on external project audits when they become excessively delayed.
• Does the project stimulate demand for other local companies? Are associated policy measures
needed to support the development of these companies? 
• In fact, more generally, can the project be considered as a stand-alone activity, or would it be
better to support a package of mutually reinforcing investments? This is particularly an issue when
new businesses are introduced to an area.
• Does public support actually change location decisions? Is there the likelihood that the project
would go ahead anyway? In this case the windfall from public support could be used for other
purposes. For example, the refinancing of investments that are underway will support the
beneficiary, but will not lead to regional development unless the beneficiary has a dedicated
mission with that aim. This is a particularly acute issue with the private sector, since private
companies naturally pursues their own profit-maximising goals.
This list, which is not exhaustive, shows the rich range of factors to be considered beyond the two
standard indicators of the economic rate of return and the physical location of an investment within
a particular administrative territory. As in other aspects of economic life, one role for EU institutions
is to assist with the exchange of best practices on these issues.
The dominant factor in regional development is the quality of local institutions. More attention
should be given to this issue. Even with the best will in the world, outsiders cannot generate high
regional growth. This being said, bad policy a t the loca l level can be reinforced by bad policy a t
the na tiona l and supra -na tiona l levels. Excessive public spending seems to be particularly
pernicious. In this volume of the EIB Papers the reader will come across examples where the policies
that were adopted were in the end worse than having no policy at all - to quote Francis Bacon:
“The remedy was worse than the disease”. The minimum goal of institutions involved in regional
development must at least be to ensure that they avoid that state of affairs.
EU institutions should
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